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The Transformation of Urban Vegetable Retail in China:  
Wet Markets, Supermarkets, and Informal Markets in Shanghai 
 
Abstract 
The state-monopolised system of vegetable retail in socialist urban China has transformed into a 
market-based system run by profit-driven actors. Publicly owned wet markets not only declined 
in number after the state relegated its construction to market forces, but were also thoroughly 
privatised, becoming venues of capital accumulation for the market operators now controlling 
these properties. Self-employed migrant families replaced salaried state employees in the labour 
force. Governments’ increased control over urban public space reduced the room for informal 
markets, exacerbating the scarcity of vegetable retail space. Fragmentation in the production and 
wholesale systems restricted modern supermarkets’ ability to establish streamlined supply chains 
and made them less competitive than wet markets. The transformation of urban vegetable retail 
documented here shows both the advance that capital has made in re-shaping China’s agrifood 
system and the constraints that China’s socialist institutions impose on it. Shanghai’s experience 
also shows that the relative competitiveness of various retail formats is shaped by the state’s 
intervention in building market infrastructure and institutions. 
 
Keywords: vegetable retail; food price; supermarkets; wet markets; urban space; China. 
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Introduction 
For the year 2010, inflation haunted China’s rapidly growing economy. Leading the 
increase in consumer prices, however, was a surprising candidate. Among all major consumer 
prices, urban food prices registered the only double-digit inflation for the year and were 
responsible for 65% of the annual rise in the consumer price index (CPI) (Huang, 2011). In 
November 2010, China’s CPI rose to a 28-month high of 5.1% increase from a year ago, led by 
an 11.7 % surge in food prices, which constituted about one third of the CPI (Xinhua News, 
2010a). This rise was mainly a result of sharply rising urban vegetable prices, which contributed 
to about 20% of the percentage of foods in the CPI. For the first half of November, the average 
wholesale price of 18 types of vegetables in 36 large cities rose 62.4% from a year ago (Xinhua 
News, 2010b). The rise in food prices tapered off after November, only to pick up speed again in 
2011: by May 2011, the CPI has surpassed 5% for three months in a row and reached a 34-month 
high of 5.5% in May (Huang, 2011). Again, the main driving force is soaring food prices, which 
rose 11.7% in May from a year ago.1 Rising food prices in Chinese cities even drove residents in 
the southern city of Shenzhen, which borders Hong Kong, to do their daily grocery shopping 
across the border (Li and Qian, 2010).  
Rising vegetable prices roused widespread public concerns. China’s central government, 
concerned with both an overheating in the economy and growing public discontent, stepped in 
with administrative measures to control food prices. In November 19, 2011, the State Council 
released Document 40, aimed at stabilising consumer prices. Among the 16 remedial measures 
proposed in Document 40, five were specifically about vegetable retail price. 
Causes of the rise in urban vegetable retail prices and the effectiveness of state’s price 
control measures are still debated. Most media reports noted that the price rise was not a result of 
 5 
sharply changed supply or demand, much of the increased cost occurred during the distribution 
and marketing processes, and, vegetable farmers benefited little (China Economic Times, 2010; 
USDA, 2010). Cyclical fluctuations aside, rising vegetables prices in cities reflect fundamental 
changes that have happened in the systems of production, distribution and marketing of 
foodstuffs in China. While media reports on rising vegetable prices identified a host of potential 
culprits, including loss of peri-urban vegetable farms to urban expansion, rising distribution costs, 
and speculative hoarding, they fell short of providing a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of 
these systemic changes. The scholarly literature on the transformations of both the agrifood 
system and retail system in China also has limited purchase on this issue. Existing studies focus 
on either changes in vegetable production or the role of the newly emerged supermarket sector in 
urban food retail (Goldman, 2000; Hu et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2009; Zhang and Donaldson, 
2008). On the other hand, studies that examine the transformation of China’s agrifood system 
from a specific sector so far have only looked at animal-based foods (Brown et al., 2002; Fuller 
et al., 2006); the special characteristics of vegetables, however, as shown later, shape market 
dynamics in unique ways.  
More specifically on urban vegetable marketing, existing studies only examine the rise of 
supermarkets and emergence of modern supply chains, as they present new forms of marketing 
and are considered the most significant change in food retail (Goldman, 2000; Hu et al., 2004; 
Sternquist and Chen, 2006; Wang et al., 2009). This narrow focus, however, obscures the 
profound changes in traditional marketing channels, which till this day still dominates vegetable 
retail in Chinese cities, occupying market shares over 80%. These existing studies focus more on 
technical aspects of marketing, such as changing market shares, spatial distribution and diffusion 
of markets, methods of procurement and distribution, and supplier-buyer relationship. They have 
 6 
overlooked the socio-political aspects of urban food retail – the role of the state, the evolution 
and outcomes of policies, the entry of new players, the interactions between state and market 
actors in transforming and shaping the mode of governance in this market, and the relationship 
between economic transition and public policies. These socio-political dynamics become 
apparent when we shift the focus to the transformation of the entire urban vegetable retail system. 
Similarly, the broader debate on whether supermarkets will gain dominance in food retailing in 
Asia so far has not carefully examined how state actors can create market infrastructure and 
institutions that shape the relative competitiveness of various retail formats and lead to either the 
“rise of supermarkets” or the persistence of wet markets (Goldman et al., 1999; Goldman et al., 
2002; Gorton et al., 2011; Reardon et al., 2003).  
Over thirty years ago, in his study of vegetable supply and marketing under socialist 
China, Skinner (1978: 733) perceptively pointed out that, “the logistics of feeding urban 
population is critical in any complex society, indicative inter alia of priorities and procedural 
preferences in the social system.” As Chinese cities experience rapid population growth and a 
transition from the planned economy and socialist urban system to a market-based, capitalist 
urban system, feeding the growing urban population presents unique challenges to local states. 
More than any other foodstuffs, vegetable, because of its high perishability, large variety, 
varying regional preferences, and discrepancy between year-round consumption and seasonal 
production, presents the greatest challenge to the local state and urban food retail system. Thus, a 
study of vegetable retail exposes to the fullest weaknesses in any system of urban food supply 
and the social processes that both create them and attempt to address them. It helps not only 
address the immediate question about rising food prices, but more importantly, understand how, 
in China’s economic transition, state and market actors interact to transform the agrifood system.  
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The goal of this study is not to quantitatively figure out what factor contributed how 
much to rising vegetable prices in Chinese cities, but rather to qualitatively document how the 
system of vegetable retail has changed, analyze how state policies and market forces contributed 
to these changes, and assess the impact of these changes on both vegetable retail and the state’s 
ability in managing urban food supply. Changes in urban vegetable retail are connected to those 
in the production and wholesale distribution of vegetables, which deserve in-depth investigations 
on their own. In this study, we limit our scope to vegetable retail in cities and rely on secondary 
sources when discussing how changes in the production and wholesale distribution of vegetables 
affect the urban retail system.  
In the remainder of the article, we first introduce the methods used in case selection and 
data collection. Following that is a brief review of urban vegetable retail under China’s socialist 
planned economy. We then document key changes in this system in recent decades. We analyze 
from three aspects the interactions between the local state and nonstate actors and the new 
market structure and institutions that emerged: transformation of traditional vegetable markets, 
emergence of new retail formats such as supermarkets, and changes in informal markets. This 
analysis shows that vegetable retail in urban China has been transformed from an enterprise of 
public service run by the state to one of profit seeking run by both private and bureaucratic 
capitals. The state not only retreated from building retail space and managing the supply and 
marketing of vegetables in cities, its policies also curtailed the informal market; market forces, 
on the other hand, failed to pick up the slack in some areas. These developments strengthened the 
grip that private and bureaucratic capitals had over the increasingly scarce urban vegetable retail 
space and led to rising prices.  
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Methods and Data 
We selected China’s largest city, Shanghai, to conduct a case study. Shanghai is the most 
studied case in the literature on urban food retail in China (Goldman, 2000; Hu et al., 2004; 
Skinner, 1978; Sternquist and Chen, 2006; Wang and Zhang, 2005). On the consumption side, 
Shanghai has not only the largest urban population in China (23 million in the 2010 National 
Census), but also a local dietary tradition that stresses year-round consumption of fresh 
vegetables, especially the green leafy varieties. On the marketing side, Shanghai has the most 
developed retail system in China, with the largest number of supermarkets, chain stores, and 
foreign retailers, and the biggest department stores (Goldman, 2000; Wang and Zhang, 2005). 
Convenient access to fresh vegetables at affordable prices has particular economic importance 
and political sensitivity in Shanghai; providing such access to a large population in a sprawling 
city presents a high challenge to both the local state and market actors. Large cities in China 
evolved from a similar system of vegetable marketing and now face similar challenges and 
constraints in transforming it. Developments in Shanghai – the success or failure of state policies 
and the modern marketing system in addressing this challenge – are therefore a harbinger for 
what is to come in other Chinese cities. 
Our data on vegetable retail in Shanghai come from both primary and secondary sources. 
We collected statistical data and government documents related to vegetable retail. Among the 
nine central-city districts in Shanghai, we selected one – Yangpu, in northeast Shanghai – to 
conduct primary data collection. Over a three-month period in 2011, we visited all types of 
vegetable retail outlets and interviewed parties involved in vegetable retailing. These include 
different types of retailers (vendors in general food markets, owners of small shops, and itinerant 
street hawkers), shoppers, managers in market-operating companies, and government officials. 
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Officials from two types of government agencies were interviewed: the specialised regulatory 
agency in charge of retail commerce in the district, the District Commerce Committee, and the 
sub-district, grassroots level government (either a ward or town). On supermarkets, which have 
been well-studied in both academic and trade publications, we rely solely on secondary sources.  
 
Urban Vegetable Retail under Socialism 
Under the socialist planned economy, the supply and marketing of foodstuffs for the 
urban population was a state responsibility, whereas for rural residents, foodstuffs were self-
supplied within the rural communes (Skinner, 1978). In cities, the socialist state designed and 
built a system of vegetable production, distribution, and marketing based on two strategies: self-
sufficiency in production and centralised procurement and monopolised retailing in distribution 
and marketing.  
The strategy of self-sufficiency in vegetable production required municipal governments 
to maximise the proportion of each city’s vegetable supply produced within the municipal 
jurisdiction. A Chinese municipality is a territorial administrative unit that has both a built-up 
urban area at its core and the surrounding rural hinterlands incorporated as subordinate units. 
Take Shanghai for example: in the 1980s, the municipality comprised 10 urban districts that 
constituted the city proper of Shanghai, with an urban population of around six million, plus 10 
counties that were largely rural and much bigger in area, with a population of around five million. 
This administrative structure and the collectivisation of agriculture, in which production 
decisions were made by collective authorities according to government planning, allowed cities 
to meet their urban populations’ demands for vegetables with production in peri-urban areas – 
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the surrounding rural counties. In the late 1970s, most large cities in China maintained rates of 
vegetable self-sufficiency over 85% (Skinner, 1978). 
Vegetables harvested from rural production units were then delivered to designated 
procurement stations managed by the Municipal Vegetable Company (MVC) to be weighed, 
graded, and valued, and entered the system of centralised procurement and monopolised retailing. 
The MVC was one of the several specialised companies under the municipality’s Second 
Commercial Bureau that managed the supply and marketing of various foodstuffs. The supply of 
vegetables into cities and the retailing within cities were both monopolised by the MVC. Peri-
urban vegetable farmers often tried to circumvent this monopoly by bringing their surplus 
produce into cities and selling on sidewalks. These informal retail activities posed a threat to 
both the rural collective authorities, whose ability to meet compulsory production quotas was 
undermined, and the MVC, whose retail outlets faced the competition. These authorities actively 
sought to thwart such attempts, sometimes even mobilising paramilitary forces to stop the 
farmers (Wang, 2008). 
The MVC distributed the procured vegetables through a hierarchy of wholesale and retail 
outlets spread throughout the city. The MVC usually had a branch office in each urban district 
that directly managed the vegetable retail cluster in that district. Generally speaking, within an 
urban district, each ward – the administrative sub-unit – had at least one general food market, 
supplemented by a number of smaller specialised shops and stalls selling vegetables. Large 
general food markets in densely populated city wards had thousands of square meters of floor 
space and hundreds of full-time employees, serving tens of thousands of customers and selling 
vegetables by the tens of thousands of kilograms on a daily basis (Skinner, 1978). In these 
general food markets, the vegetable departments were invariably the largest in floor space among 
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all the departments that sold the full range of foodstuffs and beverages – except for grain, which 
was procured by the Municipal Grain Bureau and sold in specialised stores. In Shanghai in 1977, 
the MVC had 12 branch offices, corresponding to the 10 urban districts and the two industrial 
towns of Minhang and Wusong in the counties. Together, these 12 branch offices managed over 
200 general food markets and over 500 vegetable shops and stalls, distributed across the 110 city 
wards (Skinner, 1978). On average, in Shanghai then, each general food market served a 
population of 27-28,000. 
This system of centralised procurement and monopolised retailing, first established in the 
1950s, had many advantages in socialist China’s specific context. In its practice over 30 years, 
despite the country’s severely underdeveloped infrastructure of transportation and storage, the 
system had managed to maintain relatively stable supply of fresh vegetables at low costs to the 
large urban population in China (Skinner, 1978). It, however, was also plagued by problems. The 
centralised procurement system provided guaranteed purchase of all outputs at fixed prices. This 
gave rural production units incentives to pursue greater volumes of production in disregard of 
quality, and increase in-season production when costs were low while decreasing the more costly 
off-season production. Such practices resulted in deteriorating qualities and sharp seasonal 
fluctuations in quantities in the urban vegetable market. The state-run retail system, while easily 
accessible to urban residents, was notorious for its poor services, lack of choices, and heavy 
wastage (Veeck and Veeck, 2000). Food markets were in poor physical conditions. Even many 
of the larger general food markets were not housed in permanent buildings, but simply in tents 
on the streets or temporary sheds. These markets were traditional “wet markets” in the true sense: 
the floor was constantly wet from the spraying of vegetables and cleaning of meat and fish and 
littered with waste. In managing this system, municipal governments not only had to shoulder the 
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heavy financial burdens caused by inefficient operation and price subsidies, they also constantly 
incurred the ire of some constituencies: urban residents when vegetables were difficult to buy in 
low seasons and rural residents when vegetables were hard to sell in high seasons.  
This system contrasted sharply with that in developed countries, characterised by large-
scale, regionally specialised vegetable production, long-distance transportation and large-area 
distribution, market integration of supply and demand, privately run retail outlets, and bulk 
purchase at supermarkets. As China makes the transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy and Chinese cities experiences rapid growth, is its system of vegetable supply and 
marketing converging to the Western model? What forces are transforming this system? How are 
the socialist legacies shaping the emerging new market system? We turn to these questions next. 
 
Transformation of Urban Vegetable Retail 
In the 1980s, both pillars of the socialist system of urban vegetable supply and marketing 
were undermined by China’s market reform. On the production side, the decollectivisation in 
agriculture disbanded collective communes and brigades and devolved land use rights to 
individual households. The state gradually removed compulsory production quotas for 
households and restrictions on crop choice. By early 2000s, agricultural production in China has 
been fully liberalised to give rural households full autonomy in crop choice and even staying in 
farming or not; the state now only has economic means to influence farmers’ production 
decisions. This led to both the decline of peri-urban vegetable farming, as the peri-urban areas 
not only lost vegetable land to urban expansion, but also labour force to more rewarding nonfarm 
jobs, and the rise of regional specialisation – large-scale vegetable production in rural areas 
distant from urban markets. The centre of gravity in vegetable production has shifted from peri-
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urban areas of municipalities to rural areas, where, by early 2000s, 80% of China’s vegetable 
production areas are located (Liu et al., 2002).  
These two changes made self-sufficiency in vegetable production untenable. Since much 
of the vegetables supplied to a city now came from outside the municipality – in 2010, most 
large cities had a self-sufficiency rate lower than 30% (Liu and Wu, 2011) – it became 
impossible for the MVC to procure all of them and monopolise the retailing in the city. Forced 
by the practical difficulties of maintaining the old system, but also motivated by the guiding 
ideology of the marketisation reform, in the 1980s, municipalities all across China started to 
reform centralised procurement and monopolised retailing. Many gradual steps were taken over 
the two decades and local variations abounded.2 In general, municipal governments retreated first 
from directly retailing vegetables and then from operating the markets; they not only allowed 
private actors to enter vegetable retailing, but increasingly relied on them for the construction 
and operation of market places.  
Figure 1 presents the actors in the fresh vegetable trade in urban China today. In the 
following, we use the example of Shanghai to illustrate the transformation of the urban vegetable 
marketing system by examining changes in the three types of retail channels: first, the traditional 
fixed markets – wet markets and small vegetable shops, which used to monopolise urban 
vegetable retail; second, the newly emerged supermarkets and private vegetable shops; and third, 
street vegetable hawkers in the informal market.  
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Fig. 1. Vegetable supply chains to consumers in Chinese cities. (Block arrows indicate the 
dominant flows of products going out from sources.) 
 
Wet Markets: From Public Service to Profit Making 
During Shanghai’s rapid urban development in the past three decades, some of the 
general food markets (caishichang in Chinese; hereafter, simply “wet markets”) – the backbone 
of the socialist state-run vegetable retail system – have simply vanished; at the same time, both 
the urban population and the demand for vegetable retail facilities have increased. Take for 
example Yangpu district, the most populous (1.31 million) among the nine central-city districts. 
Three processes have reshaped its demography in recent decades. First, municipal and 
commercial projects in the city centre led to the demolition of old neighbourhoods and relocation 
of residents (chaiqian, in Chinese) to the less densely populated Yangpu. Throughout the late 
1980s and 1990s, for example, the municipal government relocated about 200,000 residents from 
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central-city areas to publicly built apartment buildings in the far northeast corner of Yangpu – 
today’s Yinxing ward, which used to be farmland. Second, Yangpu received a massive influx of 
migrants from outside the municipality. From 2000 to 2010, the migrant population in Yangpu 
rose from 152,502 to 275,303, an 80.5 % increase (Yangpu Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Third, 
urban development took over all agricultural land in the district and turned former vegetable 
farmers living on the outskirts of the district into urban residents.  
While the resident population in Yangpu increased from 1.24 million to 1.31 million 
during 2000 and 2010, the number of wet markets decreased from 73 in 2002 to 52 in 2010.3 As 
a result, the average number of residents each wet market serves has increased nearly 50% from 
17,000 to 25,000. Three processes contributed to the decline of wet markets. First and foremost, 
once the state had opened up the urban real estate market and retreated from building public 
housing, it also stopped building new wet markets as matching facilities, but instead left it to 
markets to supply the retail space (Office of Shanghai Chronicles, 1996). Second, urban 
development gradually took up the idled land on which some wet markets had been located and 
drove out these wet markets, most of which had nowhere else to go. Third, wet markets located 
in old residential neighbourhoods were shut down when the entire neighbourhoods were 
demolished during the chaiqian. The government required developers of new real estate projects 
that would house the relocated residents to compensate the lost wet markets with new ones; 
however, as shown later, this decree has fallen on deaf ears.  
The lack of coordination between these two sets of urban development processes – 
demographic changes that redistribute the urban population and physical changes that relocate 
wet markets – has exacerbated the spatial mismatch between residential congregations and wet 
markets and intensified the difficulties that some residents had in accessing vegetable retail 
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outlets. In Yangpu for example, the Changbai ward, a newly developed area on the eastern rim of 
the district where many new apartment buildings were built in recent years, has a population of 
95,000, served by three wet markets – on average over 30,000 residents per market. In 
comparison, the Siping ward, a mature urban area near the city centre, has roughly the same 
population (100,000), but seven wet markets – each serving an average of only 14,000 residents.  
The wet markets that remain in operation have also become very different than their 
predecessors under the state-run monopolised retail system. The liberalisation of China’s state-
controlled agrifood commerce system started in the mid-1980s in the urban fresh food retail 
sector. Municipal governments opened state-run wet markets to private retailers, tolerated 
hawking of fresh produce by farmers on city streets, and even encouraged nonstate actors, 
including collective organisations and private firms, to set up wholesale markets and retail wet 
markets on government-granted land (Hu et al., 2004; Rozelle et al., 2000; Wang, 2008). 
Competition from these nonstate wet markets –jimaoshichang or nongmaoshichang in Chinese – 
further undermined the viability of their state-run counterparts. In nonstate wet markets, since 
prices were not restricted by government mandates, sellers could ask for higher prices for fresher 
and higher-quality vegetables. As a result, higher-quality vegetables concentrated in these 
nonstate markets, and with it, so did the more affluent consumers who were willing to pay extra 
for quality. The MVC, on the other hand, which did the planned procurement and operated all 
state-run wet markets, faced dire situations. It had greater difficulties in procuring high-quality 
vegetables, but became a dumping ground of low-quality products by producers, especially in 
peak seasons. The liberalisation soon turned the already loss-making MVC and the vegetable 
retail system it operated into an even heavier financial burden for municipal governments.  
 17 
Competition from nonstate wet markets not only made it imperative for municipal 
governments to reform the state-run retail system, it also suggested a solution: since market 
allocation and private actors had proven more efficient in running urban vegetable retail, the 
state-run retail system should also be marketised and privatised. After a few failed attempts of 
incremental reform, such as giving the MVC more autonomy in procuring from outside the plan 
and more flexibility in setting prices in wet markets, governments in large Chinese cities started 
wholesale privatisation in the urban commercial system – a part of the larger reform of 
ownership restructuring in the state-owned sector that started in 1993. All kinds of retail 
establishments run by the commercial bureaus of municipal governments, including wet markets, 
restaurants, barber shops, and department stores, were privatised – mostly sold to managers and 
employees of the enterprises at heavily discounted prices. Eager to relieve themselves of these 
financial burdens and push forward the centrally mandated ownership restructuring reform, 
municipal governments did not bargain hard. Although the new private owners were supposed to 
retain state employees in the privatised firms, most summarily fired the state workers and hired 
cheaper migrant workers. Supervision over the privatised wet markets changed from the MVC to 
the Administration for Industry and Commerce in each district.  
Privatisation of the vegetable retail cluster in each district was carried out by the district 
government, leading to variations in methods and pace even within the same city. In Shanghai, 
Yangpu was the slowest in privatising its vegetable retail facilities. Today, among the 52 wet 
markets in Yangpu, more than half remain owned and operated by state-owned companies. In 
contrast, state-owned wet markets in Zhabei and Pudong districts were fully privatised. In these 
districts, the former Vegetable Companies still exist in name, but have ceased all business 
functions and now simply manage the remaining assets and debts that remain and handle 
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pensioner affairs.4 Overall, of the 930 wet markets in today’s Shanghai, about 80 % are privately 
operated, a sea change from just two decades ago (Qian, 2011).5  
The opening up of the urban vegetable retail market, together with liberalisation in 
vegetable production, increased the variety and quality of vegetables sold in cities, reduced 
seasonal fluctuations, and improved service quality. These improvements aside, the privatisation 
of vegetable retail facilities, however, also led to rising vegetable prices in Chinese cities. Part of 
the price increase went to cover the rising costs of longer transportation, better quality, and 
improved services. But consumers also paid a premium for the transformation of a state-managed 
public service into a profit-seeking enterprise run by private and bureaucratic capitals.  
In the privatised wet markets, the physical setting stays the same – the floor space is 
divided into small stalls, lined along narrow corridors. Small vendors, who lease stalls from these 
operators, buy fresh vegetables from various sources, including wholesale markets, rural 
merchants, and farmers’ cooperatives, sort, clean, and package the vegetables, and sell to 
consumers. Market operators collecte from vendors both rents for the floor space and fees for 
utility usage and for services such as waste disposal, security, and facility maintenance. In the 
past, the MVC used state-granted properties and hired a large staff to do vegetable procurement 
and retailing; in contrast, these new market operators, who either own the property that houses 
the market or lease it on long terms, are instead in the business of operating commercial real 
estate. As the housing boom in Chinese cities in recent years drove real estate prices to ever 
higher grounds, market operators also kept their rental charges abreast with the rising market, 
seeking a return comparable to other investments in urban real estate. One investigation 
conducted by the China Central Television (CCTV, 2010) in several large cities found sharp 
increases in rental charges across the board. In one Beijing market, monthly rent for a small 
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vegetable stall rose from 280 yuan in 2002 to 850 in 2010. In another market in Shanghai’s 
Pudong district, the monthly rent for a vegetable stall went from 200 yuan in 2003, when the 
market was still operated by the ward government, to 800 yuan in 2009 when it was privatised. 
Vegetable vendors we interviewed in Yangpu also complained about the doubling of their rents 
over the past few years. Although no nationwide or citywide survey data are available, similar 
rises in rental charges in many cities have been widely reported in Chinese media.  
To small vegetable vendors, the rental fee now constitutes a major part of their operating 
cost. In Mingyan Market, a privately run, small wet market on North Guoquan Road, for 
example, the operator now charges a monthly rent of 300 yuan/m2 for vegetable stalls, which 
usually take two to three square meters. Besides that, a vendor also pays the operator annually 
300 yuan for the use of a certified electronic scale, 300 yuan for registration renewal, 200 yuan 
for security, 1200 yuan for parking, and the actual usage of water and electricity. All these add at 
least another 250 yuan each month and raise their monthly costs to around 1200 yuan. For a 
vegetable stall that has total revenue around 20,000 yuan/month, this operating cost cuts deeply 
into their profit margin, which is already made small and precarious by the heavy wastage in 
fresh vegetable retailing. They have to recoup it from higher prices charged to consumers. 
Wet markets operated by state-owned companies have adopted the same mode of 
operation and profit motive. The only difference between private- and state-operated wet markets 
is that, while the former are run by private capital, the latter by bureaucratic capital – but profit-
seeking capital nonetheless. The state-owned companies that own and operate wet markets in 
Chinese cities today are a different species than the MVCs of socialist China; they are the 
products of local state entrepreneurialism. In the 1990s, parallel to the ownership restructuring in 
SOEs that pulled local states out of managing enterprises, the central government instituted two 
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other reforms – fiscal re-centralisation and bureaucratic restructuring – both of which also aimed 
at downsizing local state bureaucracies and creating more room for market growth. These 
reforms, however, unintentionally triggered a counter process – state entrepreneurialism – that 
pushed local states into setting up and running a new kind of market-oriented and profit-seeking 
businesses to both make up for lost revenues and divert redundant employees (Duckett, 1998). 
Unlike the traditional SOEs, which produced under central planning and had few profit motives, 
these new enterprises used the state-owned assets they controlled to seek profit in competitive 
markets; more importantly, the entrepreneurial local state that created them did so not to provide 
public welfare but to generate profits.  
The reform of the district branch of MVC in Yangpu is a typical example of local state 
entrepreneurialism. When privatisation of the commerce system started in Shanghai in early 
1990s, because there was less private capital available in the less developed Yangpu that could 
take over the large assets of wet markets, the district government took a different approach. It re-
structured its MVC branch into two new entities. One is a shareholding company called Yangpu 
Markets Markets Operation and Management Ltd. Co. (hereafter, simply Yangpu Markets); the 
other is a holding company called Shanghai Yangpu (Group) Company, which owns majority 
shares in the former. Some of the state-owned wet markets run by the MVC in Yangpu were 
privatised; the rest were taken over by Yangpu Markets. Today, Yangpu Markets operates 24 wet 
markets in the district, a 46% market share. Among these, 18 are housed in properties owned 
previously by the MVC and now by Yangpu Markets and six in properties leased from other 
state entities. Through this restructuring, the former MVC branch, a mass retailer of vegetables, 
was transformed into Yangpu Markets, a commercial real estate operator that charges vendors 
who lease retail space from it exactly the same fees as their private counterparts. The Yangpu 
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(Group) Company, on the other hand, manages the affairs of pensioners and laid-off workers 
from the disbanded MVC branch and relies on profit remittance from Yangpu Markets to pay for 
its functions. Just as the district government has Yangpu Markets, grassroots level governments 
also have their own entrepreneurial ventures. The Wujiaochang town under Yangpu district, an 
equivalent of a city ward, for example, owns the Xiangying Industry and Trade Company, whose 
core business is operating five wet markets in the town. In our interviews, both vendors and 
company managers confirmed that these state-owned markets charge rents and other service fees 
at “market rates.”  
Governments can also add fuel to the rising rents in wet markets. In Shanghai, the 
municipal government launched a three-year campaign in 2005 to upgrade and standardise 
existing wet markets. Markets that underwent the upgrade would have standardised layout, 
improved ventilation and waste treatment facilities, upgraded storage and display facilities, 
clearer labelling of price and product origins, and stricter trainings for personnel. By the time the 
campaign ended in 2007, a total of 600 wet markets citywide had been upgraded to certified 
standardised food markets. The upgrading certainly improved the facilities and hygiene at wet 
markets, making the name a misnomer as some markets no longer have wet floor. While both the 
municipal and district governments provided funds for the upgrading (in Yangpu, 150,000 yuan 
from each for a wet market), much of the expenses still had to be shouldered by market operators, 
who, in turn, had to recoup those through further raising rents and fees. For example, one market 
in Pudong District’s Zhoupu Town raised the annual rent for a vegetable stall from the pre-
upgrading 2,000 yuan to 10,000 yuan after the upgrading was completed (Lu, 2010). 
The privatisation of wet markets also changed the labour force of urban vegetable 
retailing. Under the state-run system, the MVC had thousands of salaried employees, most of 
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whom were native, urban residents.6 Like workers in other state-owned work units under 
socialism, although they had meagre wages, these employees enjoyed a whole range of benefits 
that included housing, health care, and pension (Office of Shanghai Chronicles, 1996). Today, 
successors to both the municipal and district Vegetable Companies only manage wholesale or 
retail markets. On the other hand, the urban-origin, salaried state employees that worked at the 
counters have all been replaced by a self-employed labour force that consists primarily of 
migrant families, mostly hailing from provinces in eastern China. Again, no citywide statistics 
are available, but in our interviews at nine wet markets in Yangpu, we did not meet a single 
vegetable vendor who is a native of Shanghai.7 Reports in Chinese media find the same pattern 
(CCTV, 2010; Qian, 2011). One survey in Nanjing finds that only 30% of all wet-markets food 
vendors in the city are natives (Huang, 2005).  
Now there are no companies like the MVC that had specialised employees dealing with 
the purchasing from wholesale markets, the sorting, cleaning and packaging of vegetables, and 
then the retailing to consumers separately, private vendors in today’s wet markets have to do all 
by themselves. This means getting to the wholesale market on outskirts of the city around four 
o’clock every morning (or, two o’clock for those without an automobile), setting up the stall by 
six, haggling with customers for 12 hours, and constantly cleaning and spraying the vegetables to 
extend shelf life. This kind of intensive labour, which requires at least two adults, is best 
provided through using family labour and through self-exploitation. Migrant families are more 
capable of doing such intensive labouring than urban natives, whose family members are more 
likely to engage in different jobs. These migrant families, unlike state employees of the MVC 
who enjoyed subsidised housing and other benefits provided by the state, are fully dependent on 
markets for their labour reproduction and have to cover all expenses from vegetable sales. This 
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change has therefore created a channel that made the steadily rising living expenses in cities, 
especially rents for housing, a component in rising vegetable prices. 
To summarise, the vegetable retail system established under socialism, which had 
provided urban residents fresh vegetables at low prices and convenient locations, albeit 
unsatisfactory quality, collapsed together with other parts of the socialist “urban public goods 
regime” in China’s market transition (Solinger, 1995). The market-based, largely privatised 
system that replaced it brought many benefits; but it also reduced the availability of vegetable 
retail facilities and increased prices. Part of the price rise simply resulted from the removal of 
state subsidies that kept vegetable prices artificially low for urban residents under the planned 
economy, but part of it came from the change in the economic actors who run the system and 
their motives. Profit-driven actors, including private capital owners, local entrepreneurial states, 
and self-employed migrants, replaced the nonprofit, paternalistic socialist state and turned 
neighbourhood wet markets from a public asset into a venue for capital accumulation. The 
private and bureaucratic capitals that now control the declining number of wet markets have 
become particularly powerful in the market, as the state not only provided them the assets 
through privatisation, but also inadvertently increased the scarcity of these assets through other 
reform policies, a point elaborated later. 
 
New Markets: Unfulfilled Potential 
The liberalisation of urban vegetable retail allowed new venues of vegetable retail to 
emerge. Compared to developed countries where supermarkets dominate urban food retail, urban 
China, where consumer incomes have been rapidly rising, presents huge potential for 
supermarkets and other modern retail formats to grow and to make up for any retail space lost 
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during the transformation of the state-run retail system. Many studies on the changes in China’s 
agrifood commerce system therefore focused on the growth of supermarkets and considered this 
the main force driving China’s retail modernisation (Goldman, 2000; Hu et al., 2004; Wang et al., 
2009; Wang and Zhang, 2005).  
Modern retail formats that include hypermarkets, supermarkets, and convenience stores8 
and modern supply chains indeed have grown rapidly in China since the mid-1990s and 
especially after China started opening the domestic retail market to foreign direct investment in 
2004, as agreed in China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (Hu et al., 2004). Even in its 
second decade in China, the supermarket sector still grew at about 30% annually in the early 
2000s; this much faster rate than the growth of overall national retail sales (around 10% annually) 
indicates that supermarkets were displacing traditional retail formats (Hu et al., 2004). Shanghai 
leads the nation in retail modernisation. The three largest domestic retail chains are all based in 
Shanghai (Wang and Zhang, 2005).9 Shanghai also has the highest rate of penetration by foreign 
retail chains, especially in the hypermarket format: in 2008, the 82 foreign hypermarkets 
accounted for 78.6% of total hypermarket sales volume in Shanghai (USDA, 2011).  
The rise of supermarkets changed urban China’s retail landscape and created a new 
lifestyle for affluent consumers; but so far, it has had limited impact on the retail of fresh foods 
and not been able to shake the dominance of wet markets in that sector. Among all consumer 
products categories, they entered into fresh foods the latest and had the lowest penetration rate, 
especially in fresh vegetables (Hu et al., 2004). Without reliable sources of statistics on either 
supermarkets or fresh food retail in China, the exact share of supermarkets in fresh food retail in 
urban China is hard to come by. One industry source reports that, in 2009, the supermarket sector 
accounts for 16.7% of total food retail in the country (Datamonitor, 2010). Hu et al. (2004), 
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drawing data from a variety of sources, estimated a 30% share of supermarkets in total urban 
food retail. Studies of supermarkets in other developing countries found that fresh produce only 
accounts for 10-15% of supermarkets’ food sales (Reardon and Gulati, 2008). In China, 
supermarkets lead other formats in the sales of packaged and processed foods by large margins 
(Hu et al., 2004). Consumer studies also confirmed that most Chinese urban consumers do cross-
platform shopping: buying manufactured goods in supermarkets, but fresh foods, especially 
vegetables, in wet markets (Bai et al., 2006; Goldman, 2000). All these suggest that the share of 
supermarkets in fresh vegetable retail in Chinese cities must be much smaller than that in total 
food retail. Using a more sound method, a recent study of supermarkets’ vegetable procurement 
in Beijing found that “at most 15% of total vegetables in Beijing are sold through supermarkets 
(Wang et al., 2009, p.1799)” – an estimate that should apply to other large cities too.10 
Several factors limit supermarkets’ competitiveness in fresh foods retailing in urban 
China. Many Chinese consumers still have a cultural preference for purchasing fresh vegetable 
daily in small quantities and consuming them without refrigeration. Wet markets, especially 
when they are within walking distance, are still the ideal venue for this type of shopping. Surveys 
repeatedly found that 60-70% of urban consumers still do most of their vegetable and fruit 
shopping in wet markets and only 10-15% do so in supermarkets (Bai et al., 2006; Goldman, 
2000; Wang and Hu, 2007). Vegetables sold at supermarkets usually got there around eight 
o’clock the night before and have been shelved for at least half a day before reaching consumers. 
At wet markets, vendors buy their vegetables around four o’clock in the morning and constantly 
trim, spray, clean, and sort the vegetables to keep them fresh. Also, wet-market vendors do not 
have or use refrigerators for storage and thus have to replenish their inventory with fresh supplies 
everyday. Supermarkets simply cannot win the freshness contest.  
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More importantly, supermarkets do not have a price advantage either. Supermarkets in 
China have so far failed to establish a streamlined supply chain and modern distribution system, 
which would give them the competitive edge. The aforementioned study in Beijing found that 
supermarkets procured 85% of their vegetables from wholesale markets, just like wet-market 
vendors (Wang et al., 2009). After the procurement, supermarkets need to sort, clean, and 
package the vegetables (or pay the specialised suppliers at wholesale markets to do so), resulting 
in more wastage, longer turn-over time, and higher labour costs. They also incur higher operation 
costs, which are all passed to consumers through higher vegetable prices (Goldman, 2000).  
Supermarkets’ inability to streamline their supply chains and procure directly from 
producers is rooted in how vegetables are produced and wholesaled in China, both of which are 
still dominated by a large number of smallholders. The rise of supermarkets in China has so far 
brought little change to upstream segments of the vegetable commodity chain: there has been 
almost no penetration of modern wholesalers or retailers into rural areas, and production is still 
predominantly done by independent household producers without coordination by supermarkets 
(Wang et al., 2009). The equitable distribution of collectively owned farmland among village 
members in rural China has made small-scale, household-based farming the dominant mode in 
agricultural production and limited the possibility of larger-scale, corporate farming. For 
supermarkets, the only economical way of procuring large volumes of vegetables from these 
small producers is buying at urban wholesale markets where a large number of traders have 
already aggregated the volume.  
Recently, new forms of production have emerged (Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). 
Agribusiness companies can either acquire land through leasing or reclamation and set up 
corporate farms, or organise a large number of household farmers into contract farming. 
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Vertically integrating wholesaling with vegetable production, these companies present 
supermarkets the possibility of procuring large quantities of vegetables more directly from the 
source. Leading retail chains in China have started to form contractual procurement 
arrangements with these grower-suppliers and then distribute the large volumes purchased from 
them through centralised regional distribution centres (Hu et al., 2004). Supermarkets can also 
enter contract farming arrangements with small farmers directly or buy large volumes directly 
from farmers’ cooperatives, which have grown more rapidly since 2007 (Wang et al., 2009).  
These incipient changes, however, have so far only affected a marginal share of the total 
vegetable production and retail in China.11 They will continue to grow, and help supermarkets 
lower procurement costs. But several factors will still limit the impact of this growth on 
supermarket vegetable prices. First, there is limited potential for the growth of vertical 
integration in vegetable production and wholesaling. As all farmland in rural China is allocated 
to household farmers, agribusiness companies face severe difficulties in getting the land to set up 
corporate farms. On the other hand, despite the growth in recent years, farmers’ participation in 
cooperatives remains dismally low (1% among the vegetable farmers Wang et al. [2009] 
surveyed). The development of authentic farmers’ cooperatives has been hindered by a host of 
actors (Tong and Wen, 2009; Zhang, 2012). Many cooperatives were formed by big, 
entrepreneurial farmers, with a few small famers included for window dressing, to capture state 
subsidies for cooperatives. Some agribusiness companies and commercialized agricultural 
extension agencies also re-branded themselves as “cooperatives” or formed phony cooperatives 
to qualify for government subsidies. Second, large-scale grower-suppliers can only supply a 
limited variety of vegetables to supermarkets. To meet the large volumes required by 
supermarkets, they have to specialise in a few varieties of vegetable and buy the rest from 
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wholesale markets to meet the variety demanded by supermarkets. One large grower-supplier in 
Hu et al. (2004)’s study, for example, buy 30% of its vegetables from wholesale markets. Third, 
corporate farms usually incur higher costs of production than household farmers. For one thing, 
while farmers get their land as an entitlement – not only free of charge, but also receiving direct 
subsidies from central and local governments – agribusiness companies have to bear high costs 
for obtaining land: when leasing land from villages, besides paying rents, companies cannot 
simply get rid of the villagers who have been allocated the land, but need to retain them as wage 
workers (Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). Finally, the cost saving coming from vertical integration 
mainly goes into supermarkets’ increased profit margin rather than to reduced prices for 
consumers. In fact, the typical relationship between supermarkets and grower-suppliers in China 
is not one between retailers and wholesalers, but rather that between commercial landlords and 
tenants (CCTV, 2010; Hu et al., 2004; Sternquist and Chen, 2006). Supermarkets are more 
engaged in renting shelf space to grower-suppliers than buying vegetables from them. On top of 
the higher operation costs and wastage, grower-suppliers also pay a variety of entrance fees, 
slotting fees, and promotion fees to supermarkets to put their vegetables on shelves, which in the 
cases studied by Hu et al. (2004) account for 12% of overall sales revenue.  
Around 2002, a movement of converting wet markets into supermarkets (nonggaichao in 
Chinese), promoted by municipal governments, swept many Chinese cities. Hu et al. (2004) 
proclaimed it – prematurely, now it appears – a new impetus that would propel supermarkets to 
eclipse wet markets as the dominant vegetable retailers in urban China. Ironically, the failure of 
this program puts supermarkets’ disadvantage in vegetable retailing in sharper relief. Only in two 
cities, Fuzhou and Shenzhen, the operators who acquired the privatised wet markets and 
converted them to supermarkets sustained profitable operations, mainly by successfully 
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integrating backward into vegetable wholesaling or even production. In all other cities, the 
experiment had folded by 2004 (Huang, 2005). These newly converted, small-scale supermarkets, 
operated by small firms, offered vegetables that were less fresh and more expensive than wet 
markets, and in fewer varieties and lower qualities than chain supermarkets.  
Liberalisation of vegetable retail has also failed to spur the growth of privately built wet 
markets. While municipal governments had retreated from building wet markets and hoped that 
private actors would take over it, private developers, who got their land from the governments 
dearly, showed no interest in doing so.  
A wet market, because of its needs in ventilation, waste disposal, parking and loading, 
and laying out a large number of stalls, requires a stand-alone structure, but can only generate 
limited rental revenues from the low-end retailing activities it houses. No developer would 
willingly waste their precious land on a wet market. Municipal governments had anticipated this 
and put in place zoning plans that required developers, as a condition of getting the long-term 
lease on state-owned land, to build various public facilities and retail outlets, including wet 
markets, in designated areas. Shanghai’s municipal government updates its zoning plan regularly; 
the most recent plan of 2010 specifies the target number of vegetable retail outlets to be built by 
2020, based on the principle of one wet market plus one small vegetable shop per square 
kilometre. Officially, the developer of a real estate project needs to submit a plan that specifies 
that certain space will be built and designated for either public functions such as post offices, 
neighbourhood committees, and police offices, or retail uses, especially kindergartens and wet 
markets. Construction can only start after this plan has been approved by the municipal Bureau 
of Planning. After completion, the space reserved for public utilities will be transferred to the 
government, while the developer will sell or rent the retail space, but only for the specified uses.  
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Developers, however, are loath to include a wet market in their projects. A wet market is 
costly to build; its presence also lowers the market value of the entire project, as home buyers 
want to avoid living too close to a dirty and noisy wet market. In real practice, therefore, these 
zoning regulations are constantly circumvented, violated, or ignored. Sometimes, for example, 
developers would petition to reserve space for a supermarket, which devotes much less space to 
vegetables, as a substitute for wet market. In other cases, the government wanted the investment 
from developers to re-vitalise an area and was therefore willing to relax this requirement. Details 
of these practices are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that in 2000 to 2010, in all 
the newly built residential estates in Shanghai, vegetable retail space falls far behind the target 
specified in the government’s own zoning plan.12  
The commercialisation of state land and the opening of the real estate market have 
unseated municipal governments and put profit-seeking enterprises at the driving seat of urban 
development in China, especially in building commercial and residential space. A comparison of 
two wards in Yangpu illustrates the impact of this change on the availability of vegetable retail 
space. The Yinxing ward, which used to be farmland located at the far outskirts of the city, with 
the lowest population density in Yangpu, has now become the most populous ward in entire 
Shanghai. Its population has tripled from 60,000 in 1990 to 193,000 in 2010 (Yangpu Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011). Most of the population moved here in the 1990s, when the municipal 
government started a massive project of building new apartments here to house residents 
relocated from central city areas. Various municipal agencies that built these housing projects 
carried out the municipal government’s zoning plan and built the matching wet markets. Today, 
there are 12 wet markets in Yinxing, each serving an average of about 16,000 residents; eight of 
these were built as matching facilities to new housing projects. In contrast, in Jiangpu ward, 
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nearer to the city centre, the population also nearly doubled from 54,000 in 1990 to 95,000 in 
2010. But much of this influx was brought in by real estate development led by commercial 
developers, who were much more reluctant to build wet markets. As a result, Jiangpu now has 
only four wet markets – only one built recently – each serving an average of 23,750 residents.  
Even though it has failed to provide the large-scale, one-stop-shopping wet markets, the 
liberalisation of the real estate market has increased the supply of commercial retail space in 
Chinese cities by many folds and theoretically could provide much room for small vegetable 
shops to grow and to make up for the loss in wet markets. Strolling along any streets in 
Shanghai’s residential areas today, one passes numerous small retail shops that sell everything 
from fruits to massage service, but can rarely find a vegetable shop. We, for example, canvassed 
an entire ward in Yangpu (Wujiachang town), but found only four small vegetable shops. These 
small shops all have something in common. They only sell a small number of the most often 
consumed vegetables and only stock limited volumes that are usually sold out before noon. They 
all have some sorts of direct-supply arrangements with peri-urban producers and get vegetables 
at lower costs than wholesale markets. One shop owner, Ms. Feng, who operates an 
approximately 30m2 shop along Heishan Road, the largest we saw, claims that she only stays 
afloat because of two conditions: first, her relatives (all migrants from central China’s Henan 
Province), who rent land and grow vegetables in Chongming County, supply her store at cost; 
and second, her brother rented the shop at a discount from the owner, an army hospital, by using 
his social ties. Because her shop cannot provide a large enough variety, residents usually buy 
some vegetables that are fresher and cheaper at her store on their way back from the larger wet 
market about ten minutes’ walk away.  
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These examples show how the unique features of vegetable retail in China limit the 
growth of small vegetable shops. Vegetable retail in China requires a large enough scale to 
provide the variety demanded by consumers. At wet markets, scale and variety comes from the 
congregation of scores of small vendors. Their existence, as sparsely as it may be in some urban 
areas, which satisfy consumers’ need for one-stop shopping, raises the bar of competition for 
other players. Without the scale, small shops can hardly compete with wet markets, especially if 
they pay rents at market rates and source vegetables from the same wholesale markets as wet-
market vendors do. For those like Ms. Feng, who has a price advantage because of direct supply 
and discounted rent, if they try to scale up, they will need to get government approval, which is 
based on meeting standards on waste disposal, hygiene maintenance, and traffic control, and 
more difficultly, the physical space that fits such functions. For small shop owners with limited 
capital, these are beyond their reach.  
In liberalising both vegetable retail and real estate markets, municipal governments in 
China relinquished their responsibilities in providing vegetable retail space through building wet 
markets. Market forces, however, contrary to the state’s hope, failed to address this need either. 
The rapidly growing supermarkets are constrained by the fragmented production and wholesale 
systems and only played a minor role in vegetable retailing. Real estate developers balked at 
building wet markets on the commercial land they had paid dearly to acquire. While retail space 
for small shops is widely available, small vegetable shops cannot compete with wet markets on 
scale and variety and can only play a marginal, supplementary role.  
 
Informal Markets: Struggling on the Margin 
 33 
One form of retail poses a more serious challenge to wet markets and offers a potential 
option for Chinese urban consumers looking for fresh and affordable vegetables: the informal 
markets where hawkers congregate on streets or sidewalks to sell vegetables. When vegetable 
retail market was first liberalised in the 1990s, municipal governments tolerated and sometimes 
encouraged the spontaneous emergence of “street markets” (malushichang in Chinese) in 
residential areas, where small vendors mostly consisting of peri-urban farmers sold their fresh 
produce – often laid out on the baskets in which they were carried from the field (Wang, 2008). 
Many nonstate wet markets then were nothing more than just a designated area with power hook-
ups, running water, and small booths, where farmers could come, sell out their produce in a few 
hours, and go back to the field (Veeck and Veeck, 2000). The street markets therefore didn’t 
pose a challenge to wet markets with lower prices. Instead, they supplemented wet markets by 
operating in different areas.  
In recent years, however, a confluence of forces has restricted the room for such informal 
street markets to operate in Chinese cities. These street markets, while providing convenient 
access, fresh produce, and low prices to consumers, also blocked up traffic, produced wastes, and 
created noise – all headaches to city managers. Now more interested in raising the profile of the 
city and attracting investments, many municipal governments, especially in large cities like 
Shanghai, became increasingly hostile toward informal retail activities in public space. In the 
early 2000s, a number of large and medium cities started to ban street vegetable markets, which 
usually convened in the morning, in the name of reducing traffic congestion (Hu et al., 2004). 
Cities like Shanghai and Beijing also instituted traffic regulations that prohibit farm-use vehicles, 
such as tractors and animal-drawn carts, from entering the ring roads that circle the central city. 
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Within the city proper, waves of beautification campaigns targeted street markets, an eyesore to 
urban planners.  
Starting in the late 1990s, municipal governments all over China established a formal 
agency, City Management and Administrative Enforcement Agency, to enforce city regulations 
in a wide range of areas, including the use of public space, license compliance, and building 
codes. Staff of this agency, called chengguan (city enforcers), have gained infamy all over the 
country for their coercive manners in enforcement. Illegal street hawkers are their main target. 
Confrontations between hawkers and chengguan that resulted in injury, death, or even riots were 
regular events in Chinese cities. In the most recent tragic incident in 26 July, 2011, three 
chengguans’ beating of a fruit hawker to death (a disabled veteran, no less) when confiscating 
his pushcart triggered a mass riot by thousands of peoples in Anshun city (Lianhe Zaobao, 2011).  
Rising rents in wet markets in recent years have given vendors more incentives to exit the 
market and become street hawkers. Even for those who stay, many now split the family unit into 
two: the wife manages the stall in the market, while the husband carries baskets of produce, 
selling on streets. The presence of these street hawkers threatens the profitability of market 
operators, who have both sought the help from chengguan and used their own security guards to 
dispel hawkers roaming around the market.  
Ironically, urban residents, who supposedly are the main beneficiary of street hawkers, 
can become their foe as well. For residents, while they patronise street hawkers and benefit from 
their low-fare vegetables, the conducting of this messy business around their homes also annoys 
them – just like their attitude toward wet markets, residents welcome street hawkers but not in 
their own backyards. Officials we interviewed said that in Yangpu at least, the government took 
a more tolerant approach toward street hawkers, but it is citizens’ complaints, which they had to 
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respond, that mainly drove chengguan’s enforcement. They routinely received phone calls from 
residents who spotted hawkers in their neighbourhoods – usually because they just bought from 
them – and asked the government to chase them away.  
  
Conclusions 
The sharp rise in food retail prices in Chinese cities in recent years reflects fundamental 
changes in China’s agrifood system and is an outcome of a series of policy choices made by 
municipal governments. The marketisation reform dismantled the state-run vegetable retail 
system that operated vegetable retail as a public service, and replaced it with a market-based, 
profit-driven system, run by a host of profit-seeking actors, ranging from real estate developers, 
private market operators, entrepreneurial state companies, to self-employed immigrant vendors, 
all trying to extract some surplus from consumers’ vegetable purchase and driving the retail price 
of vegetables spiralling up. In liberalising both the vegetable retail and urban real estate markets, 
the state entrusted market forces to not only run retailing more efficiently, but also provide 
sufficient space for vegetable retail. Market forces, despite expanding the supermarket sector 
rapidly, creating an unprecedented housing boom, and increasing the overall supply of retail 
space, however, have not provided adequate space for vegetable retail that meets consumers’ 
needs in variety, freshness, scale, convenience, and affordability. Instead, the market diverted 
urban land from vegetable retail to other more profitable uses. Governments’ requirement that 
developers provide space for vegetable retail was resisted by all and trampled by those who had 
the wherewithal to do so. Municipal governments themselves also helped to further reduce 
vegetable retail space with their more stringent control on public space and policing against 
informal hawking on the streets. All these changes helped to strengthen the market position of 
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wet-market operators that controlled the increasingly scarce vegetable retail space, allowing 
them to have a captured market and charge ever-increasing rents and fees, which were in turn 
passed by vendors to consumers through raised vegetable prices.  
The transformation of the urban vegetable retail system documented in this study shows 
both the advance that capital has made in re-shaping China’s agrifood system and the constraints 
that China’s socialist institutions impose on it. Previous studies of the penetration of capitalism 
in China’s agrifood system have shown how capitalist forms of production emerged in 
commercialised agriculture and gave rise to peasant differentiation (Zhang and Donaldson, 2010), 
how commercialisation turned the public agricultural extension agencies into profit-seeking 
bureaucratic capital (Tong and Wen, 2009), and how supermarkets replaced traditional retailers 
in urban food retail (Hu et al., 2004). This study further demonstrates that capital has not only led 
the expansion of new retail formats, but more importantly, has also gained control over 
traditional retail facilities, which still constitute the backbone of urban China’s food retail system, 
and infused its profit motive into all actors operating in the system. At the same time, both the 
success and failure of capital in penetrating urban vegetable retail are shaped by institutions 
established under socialism. Supermarkets failed to make more headway into vegetable retail 
because of the fragmentation in agricultural production and wholesale and the dominance of 
smallholders, a product of rural China’s entitlement-based, equitable distribution of farmland. 
Similarly, the difficulties that both small shops and supermarkets had in competing with wet 
markets and the powerful positions that the control over wet markets gave market operators 
result from the central position that wet markets occupied in the vegetable retail network 
established under socialism as a part of the urban public goods regime. One could imagine that 
had the socialist state not built all the publicly owned wet markets, a commercialised real estate 
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market would not have provided nearly as many, as shown in its inability to do so today, and 
would have given much more room for supermarkets and small shops to grow.  
This study adds another example to show the competitiveness of traditional wet markets 
in vegetable retail, especially in Asian cities that share similar dietary practices. In developed 
Asian cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, these traditional wet markets still maintain a 
stronghold in vegetable retail, despite the expansion of modern supermarkets (Goldman et al., 
1999). Even in these cities, however, the persistence of wet markets – a more competitive format 
of retailing in terms of both price and freshness, but a less efficient use of real estate than 
supermarkets – depends on government’s intervention in securing space for them in highly 
competitive real estate markets. Government agencies – Urban and Regional Councils and the 
Housing Authority in Hong Kong and the Housing and Development Board in Singapore – built 
the majority of wet markets in these cities and still directly manage some. In China, however, for 
a period of time, many municipal governments threw their support entirely behind modern 
supermarkets and took a hostile stand toward wet markets, considering it unhygienic, unsightly, 
and backward. Governments used a series of measures to undermine traditional retail formats, 
including banning the construction of new wet markets, closing down street markets, and 
converting wet markets to supermarkets (Hu et al., 2004). This contrast shows that the relative 
competitiveness between wet markets and supermarkets is not determined by some intrinsic 
features of the retail format, but rather depends on how the state builds the infrastructure and 
regulatory institutions of the food retail market. 
The recent sharp rise in food prices, however, showed that any policy responses to rising 
vegetable prices will have to address both the strong profit motives that now govern the 
vegetable retail system and the shortage of vegetable retail space in cities. In the aftermath of the 
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price rise, some municipalities started to consider turning wet markets from profit generators 
back to public service vehicles by returning privately owned markets to public ownership. In 
Shanghai, for example, Changning District started a pilot project in late 2010 that bought back 
several wet markets from private operators. These markets were reformed into non-profit 
ventures, managed by the state-owned market-operating company, an equivalent to Yangpu 
Markets, with substantially reduced rents for vendors (Qian, 2011). The municipal government, 
however, is severely financially constrained to even buy back a small portion of the hundreds of 
markets in a city.13 Furthermore, if state-owned market operators, a product of local state 
entrepreneurialism, remain mainly driven by profits, putting wet markets in their hands may not 
provide too much relief. The feasibility and effectiveness of this government buy-back program 
remains to be seen.  
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Notes: 
                                                 
1
 Vegetable prices dropped temporarily in April 2011, largely due to increased production spurred by the price rise 
of 2010. This drop, however, was short-lived, as drought in southern China soon pushed up prices again. In the last 
week of May alone, vegetable prices rose 18.8% from a week ago (Xinhua News, 2011). 
2
 In Chinese-language publications, one can find documentations of the reforms implemented in many cities. See, 
for example, Wang (2008) on Wuhan and Office of Shanghai Chronicles (1996) on Shanghai.  
3
 Data on the number of wet markets come from an interview with an official at the District Commerce Bureau and 
an internal government document, entitled “The five-year plan for food-market-construction in Yangpu district”, 
obtained from the interviewee. 
4
 Shanghai’s MVC was restructured in 1999 into Shanghai Vegetable (Group) Limited Corporation and now only 
operates large wholesale food markets that supply most of the vegetable retailers in the city. 
5
 Administrative restructuring over the years has left today’s Shanghai with only one county (Chongming) and 17 
districts, nine of which are central-city districts and the other eight re-designated from former rural counties. The 
tally of 930 here includes wet markets in all 18 units, whereas the 200 general food markets and 500 vegetable shops 
and stalls – many of which were later upgraded into small wet markets –  quoted earlier from Skinner (1978) did not 
include those in the ten rural counties at the time. 
6
 When the MVC was first formed in 1956, it had over 3000 employees. In 1990, it had 5832 regular, full-time 
employees (Office of Shanghai Chronicles, 1996). 
7
 In contrast, salespersons at the meat and tofu counters, who are salaried employees of agribusiness companies, are 
mostly Shanghai natives.  
8
 In the Chinese context, these formats include all self-service, multi-products stores and are differentiated by floor 
space: a hypermarket has over 6000m2 of floor space, a supermarket’s floor space can range from 800m2 to 6000m2, 
a discount or convenience store has only less than 400m2 (Hu et al., 2004). Convenience stores in Chinese cities 
almost never sell fresh produce. Unless specified, we use “supermarkets” to refer to both supermarkets and 
hypermarkets.  
9
 The three chains are Lianhua, Hualian, and Nonggongshang. The first two merged in 2009 to form the Bailian 
Group, but continued to operate as distinct and competitive chains.  
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10
 They found that supermarkets procured 85% of their vegetables from various types of agents in wholesale markets 
and their purchases accounted for a 9-14% share of the total sales at various markets. While supermarkets got the 
other 15% of their supply directly from producers, almost all other retailers sourced entirely from wholesale markets. 
These figures indicate that the supermarkets’ share Beijing’s vegetable retail should fall between 10-15%.  
11
 Wang et al. (2009), for example, found that supermarkets in Beijing only procured 3% of their vegetable supplies 
directly from contract farmers or their own production bases.  
12
 Interviews with various government officials in Shanghai. 
13
 To buy 75% of the wet markets in Shanghai’s nine central-city districts would cost the public coffer to the tune of 
20 to 30 billion yuan (Qian, 2011). 
